

i s s u e s o f
Democracy



TOWARDS A
COMMUNITY OF
DEMOCRACIES

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Towards a Community of Democracies

THE GREAT AMERICAN civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., used to say—quoting the French writer-philosopher, Victor Hugo—that stronger than all armies is an idea whose time has come. King was speaking of civil rights and racial equality, but he might well have been talking about democracy. At the opening of a new century that has left behind disastrous and failed experiments with authoritarian and totalitarian forms of governments, it seems that now, at long last, democracy is triumphant—at least as an idea, if not everywhere in practice.

A Community of Democracies conference will be held in Warsaw, Poland this June to celebrate the worldwide acceptance of the democratic ethos and the growing trend toward establishing democratic governments around the world. It will also examine the critical issue of how this trend might be accelerated and strengthened (see the statement of the conference organizers below). This special edition of

our electronic journal *Issues of Democracy* is being released to support this undertaking.

What precisely is democracy and what is its relationship to human rights? That is the theme of a statement authored by Harold Koh, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor. Secretary Koh presents the view of the U.S. government on this critical issue and on the upcoming conference in Warsaw.

A key theme of the Community of Democracies conference is how cooperation among existing democracies might be enhanced in order to strengthen the growing democratic trend around the world. This is the subject of a roundtable by noted experts. Included are edited remarks by Paul Wolfowitz, author and former Bush administration official; Bronislaw Geremek, historian and Polish minister of foreign affairs; and Mort Halperin, author and director of the State Department's policy planning staff.

The problems and challenges of promoting democracy around the world is the subject of an article written by Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Carothers, an international lawyer, has worked on democracy promotion for over 10 years in many parts of the world for a number of organizations.

Richard Falk, a professor of international law and practice at Princeton University, discusses the issue from a different perspective—how democracy can be promoted, or protected if need be, without threatening national sovereignty in a way that is still regarded as unacceptable by most of the international community. He argues that the search for reconciliation

between national sovereignty and human rights—and democracy is a human right as detailed in Article 21 of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights—is a complex issue with no easy answers.

Is there an ideal democratic prototype to which all nations should aspire or are there some areas of the world where more limited forms of democracy, congruent with a nation's culture and stage of economic development, might be preferable? Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and the author of a number of books, including *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*, has been a vocal exponent of universal democracy. He presents his case in a provocative article that espouses this widely held view.

The issue concludes with a variety of reference resources—books, articles and Internet sites—affording additional insight into means of fostering democracy in the 21st century.

Statement of Conference Organizers

Towards a “Community of Democracies”

Democracy has stood the test of time and has come to be recognized by peoples across regions and cultures as the form of governance that best meets their aspirations. The democratic movement now sweeping the world arose after the Second World War, as many nations asserted their freedom and independence from colonial rule. This movement surged forward again with the Portuguese peaceful revolution of 1974, the return to civilian, democratic rule in Central and South America, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the end of the oppressive apartheid regime in South Africa. Over the past decade democracy and freedom have flourished around the world. In no other period of history have so many former prisoners of conscience—Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Nelson Mandela and Kim Dae-jung, democratic activists all—risen through popular vote to the highest levels of power.

History teaches us that democratic progress is not restricted to a narrow group of countries or civilizations. And yet progress toward democracy is not inevitable; it is an ongoing process, not an end-state, requiring continuous effort and imagination. Today the worldwide democratic movement must keep pace with rapid global economic change. Democracies young and old must overcome obstacles to sustainable development and economic growth; resolve racial, ethnic and religious divisions; resist corrosive crime and corruption; and foster a culture of citizenship that instills individuals with the knowledge and

skills to assert their rights, embrace their responsibilities and participate effectively in public life.

Cooperation among democratic peoples and governments committed to advancing democracy is essential to creating a favorable international environment for development in which democracy can flourish. The United Nations (especially the U.N. Human Rights Commission) and organizations such as the European Union, Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Organization of American States, and the Organization of African Unity have done much to sustain and strengthen democratic practices around the world. The U.N.-sponsored International Conference of New or Restored Democracies, the World Movement for Democracy, and the Emerging Democracies Forum have also contributed to this essential effort.

But there has never been a dialogue among governments dedicated to exploring together how democracies might better strengthen democratic institutions and processes. The time has come to convene a meeting of the foreign ministers of all countries committed to pursuing a democratic path with the goal of fortifying democratic governance. Too often, when democratic leaders meet it is to contend with immediate crises or bilateral issues; bilateral issues will not be raised at this forum. A worldwide gathering of the full range of countries that have taken the democratic path would provide an unprecedented opportunity for exchanging experiences, identifying best practices, and formulating an agenda for international cooperation in order to realize democracy’s full potential.

The government of Poland has agreed to host such a ministerial meeting June 25–27,

2000, in Warsaw. The governments of the Czech Republic, Chile, India, the Republic of Korea, Mali and the United States have agreed to join Poland as co-conveners of the meeting.

Concurrent with the ministerial meeting, a number of distinguished thinkers and path-breaking promoters of democracy from around the world will gather in Warsaw to discuss complementary issues and ideas. These representatives of intellectual life and civil society will contribute their enormous knowledge and expertise to the ministerial sessions, presenting their ideas as to how governments and citizens can work together to strengthen and preserve democracy.

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The Right to Democracy

by Assistant Secretary of State
Harold Hongju Koh

More than 50 years have passed since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed that all human beings are “free and equal in dignity and rights.” Yet for too long, the world’s dictatorships have sought to undermine one of its most fundamental precepts: the right to democracy. Although Article 21 of the Declaration provides that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government...expressed in periodic and genuine elections,” many governments continue to deny their citizens the right to choose their own government. In too many countries, leaders speak of democracy, even as they rig elections, suppress dissent and shackle the press. In this essay on the right to democracy, Assistant Secretary of State Harold Hongju Koh looks at democracy as “a long and complex struggle, which does not come easily,” but is certainly worth the wait.

SINCE THE FOUNDING of the Republic, Americans have recognized that constitutional democracy provides the best protection for the full range of human rights. Our democratic system has empowered Americans to challenge their own government and to secure fundamental political change. From the Civil War to the civil rights movement, Americans have demanded that their government adhere to the principles of self-government and civil liberties upon which this country was founded, thereby securing the blessings of equality, liberty and justice.

The right to democratic governance is both a means and an end in the struggle for human rights. Where democratic rights are guaranteed, freedom of conscience, expression, religion and association are all bolstered. In genuine democracies, rights to a fair trial and to personal security are enhanced. Elected leaders gain legitimacy through the democratic process, allowing them to build popular support, even for economic and political reforms that may entail temporary hardships for their people.



Harold Hongju Koh

Democracy and genuine respect for human rights remain the best paths for sustainable economic growth. In contrast, an authoritarian developmental model may generate prosperity for a time, but cannot sustain it in the face of corruption, cronyism and continued denial of citizens' rights. When severe economic downturns occur, authoritarian regimes cannot respond flexibly or effectively to economic problems. Without genuine democratic mechanisms to channel popular displeasure, the government must often choose greater repression to avoid popular uprising.

Contrast Indonesia—where a Soeharto regime lacking both accountability and transparency saw an economic downturn quickly deteriorate into a political crisis that ultimately led to the regime's collapse—with the Republic of Korea, where genuinely democratic elections gave President Kim Dae Jung, a former political prisoner, the popular support he needed to implement austerity measures and economic reforms that helped return that country to prosperity. These events confirm that even in times of economic crisis, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are universal, not regional values.

To be sure, democratization is a long and complex struggle, which does not come easily.

Government “of the people” cannot be imposed from the outside. Rather, countries must come to democracy by their own path. As Secretary Albright has noted, “[D]emocracy must emerge from the desire of individuals to participate in the decisions that shape their lives.... Unlike dictatorship, democracy is never an imposition; it is always a choice.”

Moreover, democracy means far more than just holding elections. Elections should be regarded not as an end in themselves, but as the means to establish a political system that fosters the growth and self-fulfillment of its citizens by promoting and protecting their political and civil rights. Genuine democracy thus requires not just elections, but respect for human rights, including the right to political dissent; a robust civil society; the rule of law, characterized by vibrant political institutions, constitutionalism and an independent judiciary; open and competitive economic structures; an independent media capable of engaging an informed citizenry; freedom of religion and belief; mechanisms to safeguard minorities from oppressive rule by the majority; and full respect for women's and workers' rights. These principles—combined with free and fair elections—form the basis for a culture of democracy.

The United States supports democracy for the long haul. We foster the growth of democratic culture wherever it has a chance of taking hold. We focus particularly on providing support for countries in transition, defending democracies under attack and strengthening the network of established democracies. Each year, we invest over one thousand-million dollars in these efforts. We do so not just because it is right, but because it is necessary. Our own security as a nation depends upon the expansion of democracy worldwide, without which repression, corruption and instability would almost inevitably engulf countries and even regions.

Democracy holds its leaders accountable to the people. It provides breathing room for civil soci-

ety. It opens channels for the free flow of information and ideas and, for the development of diverse and vibrant economic activity. History shows that democracies are less likely to fight one another and more likely to cooperate on security issues, economic matters, environmental concerns and legal initiatives. Where democracy flourishes, so too do peace, prosperity and the rule of law.

Democracy also remains the best path to securing the promises in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This past March, while addressing the first United Nations Commission on Human Rights of the millennium, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright called upon all Commission members to reaffirm the fundamental link between democracy and human rights. On April 25, the Commission heeded her call by unanimously adopting a Romanian-sponsored resolution recognizing the right to democracy.

By its action, the Commission reaffirmed, for the second consecutive year, the indissoluble link between democracy and human rights as a critical element of the Commission's work. Last year's U.S.-sponsored resolution on the right to democracy unanimously confirmed that democracy is not a privilege, but a human right. This year's Romanian-sponsored resolution took the message further by reaffirming that member states also have a solemn responsibility to promote and protect human rights by working together to consolidate democracy. The resolution confirmed that democracy is not a regional value nested in any particular social, cultural or religious tradition, but rather a universal value rooted in the rich and diverse nature of the community of democracies.

The Romanian resolution was co-sponsored by the U.S. and 60 other governments, a number of which only recently joined the community of democracies. This year's resolution passed 45 to 0; Bhutan, Congo, Pakistan, Qatar, Rwanda and Sudan abstained, joining China and Cuba, who abstained for a second consecutive year.

The Commission's recognition of the right to democracy represents a genuinely global initiative, developed through a genuinely global process, arising from a powerful global consciousness about the indissoluble link between democracy and human rights. As Secretary Albright noted when she addressed the Commission, "Democracy is the single surest path to the preservation and promotion of human rights."

The two democracy resolutions adopted by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights lay the groundwork for a series of important ministerial-level meetings that will bring together democratic nations to discuss how they can together promote and support democracy. These include the Community of Democracies meeting in Warsaw, Poland, in June, and the new and emerging democracies meeting set for Cotonou, Benin, in December. The millennium meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, scheduled to take place in New York in September, also should address this important issue.

Since 1974, the number of democracies worldwide has quadrupled. In the past 10 years alone, the number of electoral democracies has almost doubled to 120 nations worldwide, in good measure because democratic institutions offer the best guarantee of respect for human rights as well as the best chance to improve the lives of average citizens. As Vice President Al Gore noted in his November 1998 speech at the APEC summit in Malaysia, "History has taught us that freedom—economic, political and religious freedom—unlocks a higher fraction of the human potential than any other way of organizing society." Recent events have only confirmed that democratic governance and human rights remain inextricably intertwined with our efforts to bring the blessings of prosperity, security and peace to ourselves for posterity.

Building Cooperation Among Democracies

Recently in Washington, D.C., several distinguished panelists—Dr. Bronislaw Geremek, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Poland; Carl Gershman, president of the National Endowment for Democracy; Morton H. Halperin, director of the policy planning staff at the Department of State; and Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, dean and professor of international relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)—met to discuss what they hope will transpire at the Community of Democracies Conference convening in Warsaw in June. Among the proposals for the Conference will be one to “involve governments in this process of defining and redefining democracy.”

Following is an edited transcript of the roundtable discussion, followed by comments and questions from several distinguished audience members.

Mr. Wolfowitz. If I might just say a word from my own perspective about the enormous importance of the subject that we are going to be discussing this morning: building cooperation among democracies. We have the privilege to have the Polish foreign minister, who has earned his authority in this field the hard way, with us today.

When I was assistant secretary of state for East Asia in the mid-1980s, we began to see some opportunities for democratic reform in the Philippines and some of our colleagues said, ‘you better be careful, if you get a democratic government, you will lose the American bases in that country.’ And, to make a long story short, I think President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz and our administration made the decision it was much

better to have a healthy country with no bases than bases in a sick country. And I think history has more than proven that judgment.

Indeed, I think one of the remarkable things as one looks around East Asia, an area that has gone through a terrible financial crisis in the last few years, it is the democratic countries that have done the best going in and the democratic countries that are doing the best pulling out. And while we heard for many years that there was this tradeoff between economic growth and democracy—that you had to give up the so-called luxury of democracy if you wanted to have good economic policy—I think we are seeing in places like Korea that only democratic leaders can muster the legitimacy needed to make hard decisions in a crisis like this.

Dr. Geremek. Ladies and gentlemen, if I am here, it is only for just one reason: I was one of these dreamers who thought, like Paul Wolfowitz, that freedom and democracy are universal values and will come to our countries. But we couldn't imagine that it would happen during our lifetimes.

I am here to present to you a very important initiative. First of all, I would like to say how happy we are that this conference will take place in Poland. We are proud of it. To propose Poland as the place for such a conference on democracy means that democracy—the notion of democracy—is changing. So the question is in what way is it changing?

Before presenting the idea of the Community of Democracies conference, I would like first to raise some questions concerning democracy and also to say that we have had, in the post-Communist countries in this region of Central and Eastern Europe, experience in the

use and abuse of the word “democracy.” The easiest way to keep democracy in the official language was by adding an adjective to the subject. To say “former democracy” is a bad word. “Social democracy” is an excellent word. This was the very peculiar grammar of politics, and it meant that adjectives were killing the subject.

Democracy at the same time should not always be seen as a clear success. One cannot reduce democracy to electoral techniques and simply to the rule of a majority. One can say that democracy is a process in which each generation has to redefine its own standards. We see that in the expansion of the human rights agenda. Sometimes, the promotion of other—let me say liberal—goals can be put in danger. It concerns the relationship between economic development and political democracy. It involves also the relationship between political democracy and human rights.

Political scientist Isaiah Berlin once said that political democracies could entrench murderous majorities of all kinds—and most dangerously, Berlin said, ethnic majorities. We know this from our experience at the end of the 20th century. The question is: In what way can a consensus for democracy be built, in a society, in a nation and also in the international orbit?

One could say that a kind of holy trinity of political democracy, human rights and good governance could be proposed as a good program for political stability, a lesson also for young democracies. In the 1970s, this holy trinity was understandable. But, in the 1980s, one had the feeling that this standard had been put in doubt.

In the U.N. declaration, in the U.N. charter, references to democratic rights can be found. But in the conditions of the Cold War, it was impossible to include political democracy as a part of human rights standards. When one observed discussions at the Helsinki Conference, one could see how difficult it was to apply the standards of human rights to different political realities without speaking of political freedom and democracy.

We know that democracies that respect the rights of their citizens are more peaceful, and we should also promote in international politics a respect for democracy. And we should be interested in the development of democracy, because it means also a good basis for peace and stability.

In 1999, I was the chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As such, I paid a series of visits to Central Asian countries. In one of these countries, I met a leader from the fundamentalist movement, a young man who said to me that he was very happy that I had come and that he was very happy to listen to me, because I saw democracy and human rights as such an important issue.

And he said, “That’s my dream. I want to have democracy in my country. I want to apply human rights. Because you have to know that in my country, the majority of people are believers in God; they think as I do. So we are a majority. When we take power, we will install good order and the truth. There will be no place for others.”

So that’s democracy, he said. Only what I want. And human rights? “The main human right is to believe in God and to have the possi-

bility to do so. So, thank you for your visit,” he said to me.

I told this story a week ago, speaking with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria. And he gave me another anecdote of the same kind. He was speaking with one of the leaders of the fundamentalist movement in Algeria and he asked him whether he would accept a political alternative.

“You will be in power,” he said to the fundamentalist, “but after you—in what way can you see a different government being formed?” And the answer came back, “There will be no other government than ours; we have the truth. You apply some laws invented by human beings. We apply God’s laws, so we never have to change them and there will never be a need to change our government.”

The problem of democracy is also the question of the monopoly of truth. It’s impossible to see the development of human rights, political institutions and the rule of law in a system that recognizes only one truth, where there is a monopoly of truth. In such a system there is no room for democracy.

In talking about democratic developments we must also consider the question of an erosion of trust towards politics and politicians. Such a situation can create dangers for democracy in the most violent and disturbing way. When one thinks about the origins of the Bolshevik revolution and its success, one can say that the erosion of traditional political culture was at the heart of its success.

And when one thinks about Hitler—he came to power through democratic elections but in the same situation in which the trust between rulers and the ruled had disappeared. Keeping

this in mind we should see the progress of democracy in the world not only as a success, but also as a challenge: How do we preserve the heritage of democracy and how do we escape the dangers facing us?

And finally, my last general remark: If I believe that the Community of Democracies Warsaw Conference can become an important place of discussion, that's because in my approach, the question of democracy is connected at the end of the 20th century with the notion of civil society. It would be impossible now to see the very architecture of democracy—respect for the rule of law, the rights of citizens and of minorities—without this creative foundation of civil society.

That was our experience, our experience of dissidence in the Soviet Union, as well as in Poland, in Hungary, the Czech Republic, all over the Central European region. Our experience was that we could build civil society against a totalitarian regime. At that time it was easier to build a civil society and institutions in the context of the “flying universities.” Now—under the easier circumstances of a normal democratic market-oriented society—Poland, which is still in the process of transformation, continues to face the challenge of building a strong civil society.

But our lesson also may be considered as a good experience as it relates to the international order. If a healthy civil society is such a necessary condition for the normal life of a democratic society, why limit it to national borders? This question should also be of concern to the international community. The international community should build some civil-society institutions.

We decided to prepare for this conference together with six other countries—the United States; Poland and the Czech Republic in Europe; Mali in Africa; the largest democracy in the world, India; the Republic of Korea in East Asia; and Chile in Latin America.

We saw that it would be good also to involve governments in this process of defining and redefining democracy regionally. We hope this meeting of the governmental delegations headed by foreign ministers will be a tremendous challenge to politicians. We politicians frequently think about things, but very often, we will be asked questions—good questions—and we will try to put on the table some fundamental issues.

If we say that democracy is a process, if we say that democracy should be defined and redefined, in what way can this be done?

The easy answer would be: It's first and foremost up to each country. They have to apply standards of democracy. But what are the standards of democracy?

We believe that it is good to ask this question, which is a fundamental question, and to see possible answers in the connection between economy, state and human beings. I think we can agree on a point of departure of our reflection: namely, the role of the dignity of human beings.

But in what way can the notion of the dignity of human beings be explained in political terms and also, in politics, in terms of pragmatic points?

We are aware that when governmental delegations are involved, they face limits in regard to free intellectual debate. Politicians are not created for intellectual debate. But we think

that we can be supported, in a sense, by a very important forum, the World Forum on Democracy, organized this time by NGOs. And two great institutions will be in charge of this world forum of nongovernmental organizations, Freedom House and the Polish George Soros foundation, called the Batory Foundation.

We hope these two meetings, the meeting of governments and the meeting of nongovernmental organizations, can complete and challenge each other. We hope we will try—that we will exploit the possibility of concrete discussion between these two groups, and we hope that the Warsaw Conference of Democracies will be the beginning of a reflection and of an activity in which states, governments and civil societies will be involved together.

Mr. Halperin. I am also an intellectual-turned-official, so I will suppress my doubts as well and present very briefly some observations about democracy.

The United States is delighted to join with the other six conveners in the process of putting together this Warsaw Conference of Democracies. And it has been, I think, an important experience for us in actually getting together democratic countries at different stages of development from different parts of the world and talking through what the issues are and how to organize them. I am delighted that the countries that are working on this project are represented here, including four of the ambassadors of the convening countries, and I think it is a reflection of the growing cooperation among this group of countries in creating this conference.

I want to focus just very briefly on one of the issues that I think the Community of Democracies has to deal with. And that is the question

of the right, and some would say the obligation, of democracies to do what used to be called intervening in the internal affairs of other countries when there are either threats to, or opportunities for, the advancement of democracy.

We all know that democracy is not an end point; it is rather a process or a path traveled rather than a destination, and that all democracies go through different, difficult transitions. But sometimes we have democracies at critical points in that transition, some good and some threatening. We face in the world today a number of situations where there are threats, and where there are possibilities of very great advances to democracy. Indonesia is one obvious example. Another is Nigeria. And those are two countries that we have tried to focus our energy and attention on because we think the successful completion of this stage of the democratic transition in those two countries will have enormous implications not only for the people who live there who constitute a very significant portion of the world's population, but also for the regions in which they function, for the world community as a whole.

As a result, for example, of the change in Indonesia, a majority of the Muslims in the world now live in democratic countries, as well as, I think, all of the other major religions. But the success of these two countries, we think, is also critical for the success worldwide of the enhancement of the democratic process.

We have unfortunately had, in the past few months, some examples of threats to democracy. We have learned again what we have been reminded of, which is that democratic transitions are not guaranteed to succeed. And in Pakistan, in the Ivory Coast and in Ecuador, we

have seen movements against democratically elected governments and a difficult process in the international community of how to respond to those threats, how to either roll them back or to move those countries back as quickly as possible onto the democratic process. One of the things we hope will be discussed in Warsaw is how democratic countries can do a better job of coordinating with each other in those kinds of situations.

We are now facing a very different kind of threat to a democracy in Austria. The coming to office of a government which includes people who seem not committed to the democratic process, who espouse values which we think are a threat to a democracy. And here again the democratic countries, both in Europe and throughout the world, are having to come to grips with the question of how do we deal with this situation in a way that supports those within the societies that are working to promote and advance the democratic process?

I think we all have to understand that people have to make their own democracy. We have, in the case of Poland, an heroic example of the struggle of people. And that is why we believe that Poland has earned the right to host this conference and we are delighted that Poland is willing to do so. There are other countries that we hope, in turn, will also host this conference and have an equal claim to having engaged in this struggle for democracy.

Democracy has to be built within a country. But I think increasingly we understand that the Community of Democracies has an obligation and a right to help, to intervene, if you will, when there are opportunities to advance the

democratic process and when there are threats to the democratic process that need to be overcome.

Mr. Gershman: Foreign Minister Geremek is one of the most profound and devoted partisans of democracy in the world today and he is absolutely the appropriate person to be leading this important new initiative. And Poland is the right place for the meeting to be held.

Poland's role has and continues to be critical in the worldwide struggle for democracy. It not only was the leader of the revolution of 1989 but its transition to democracy has been stunningly and unexpectedly successful. Poland continues to recognize its responsibility to others who are undergoing difficult transitions or who are still living under dictatorship. It has moved from one kind of solidarity to another kind of solidarity and it is supporting democratic movements in Belarus, in the Ukraine, in the Balkans, in the Crimea, in the Caucasus and even in Central Asia.

Let me also say that I'm delighted, knowing the evolution of this initiative of the Community of Democracies, that the word "towards" has been added to the title of the conference, because I think it is very, very important that the Community of Democracies be an aspiration and not be dubbed a reality.

Many countries are on the road to democracy, as has been said, but they are not there yet. And we at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and within the World Movement for Democracy, which is an association of nongovernmental organizations, look forward to working with this Community of Democracies initiative in the World Forum because we think that not only nongovernmen-

tal organizations have a role in this, but also that the role of governments is critical.

Democracy is stronger today than it has been in the past, but it is not secure. We have lived through a hopeful ending of a terrible century and there are many danger signals and difficult challenges that lie ahead. I will just point to six challenges that I think the democratic movement in the world faces.

The first challenge, Foreign Minister Geremek has mentioned: putting adjectives before democracy. We still have to put adjectives before democracy, because there are many countries that are not yet liberal democracies. Sometimes they have been characterized pejoratively as “illiberal” democracies or analytically as “electoral” democracies. But we know that there still is a long process to go in the consolidation of liberal democracy that involves the consolidation of stable party systems, the development of an independent judiciary, an independent media, civilian control of the military, accountable government, decentralization and developing transparent economies and dealing with the very, very difficult problem of corruption in these societies.

Mort Halperin mentioned the problem of backsliding, which is the second difficult challenge that we face not only in countries like Pakistan, which has had a coup recently, but also in countries like Venezuela that seem to be exploiting a kind of neo-authoritarian populism directed against electoral democracies that have not solved fundamental problems faced by their societies.

And then there is the third challenge that democracy faces, which is the potential of political elements today to exploit the strains of the

global economy. There is a great challenge to work out the tradeoffs between free trade and a dynamic global economy on the one hand, and protecting worker rights and mitigating the tendency toward greater economic inequality on the other hand.

We must remain committed—and this is the fourth challenge—to free and fair elections and avoid the tendency to do away with minimum standards for free and fair elections.

Elections have been a powerful tool in the transition to democracy, not just in Nigeria and Indonesia but also very recently in Croatia and in Slovakia and, we hope, in Serbia. And the democracies have found a way to support them. NED and our European friends have been active in supporting democratic movements in these countries.

We must also insist on elections with a level playing field and support boycotts of elections where such a level playing field does not exist. I also think it is important to isolate regimes that overturn the results of democratic elections. This coming May, we will witness the 10th anniversary of the election in Burma that saw an overwhelming victory by Aung San Suu Kyi, who now sits in house arrest in that country. I think this occasion should be a time of expressing solidarity with the people of Burma and not a time to begin feeling we’ve got to live with this government, which is illegitimate.

A fifth challenge we face is that of assisting democrats in authoritarian countries. This is an overwhelming challenge. I don’t know to what extent this new association of governments can become involved in it. This may be a function that is more appropriate for nongovernmental organizations to take on. But governments

have a role as well, not only in Burma but in China, in Belarus, in Cuba, in Iran, in many, many countries of the world that are ruled by dictatorships.

We've seen in the United States a tremendous outcry and controversy over the issue of a six-year-old child who may be returned to a dictatorship in Cuba, but there was not a word mentioned in the press about seven people, one 13-year-old child among them, who escaped from North Korea, China and then Russia and were sent back by Russia to China and by China to North Korea, probably, and very possibly, to be sent to a concentration camp or to their deaths.

We must raise the issue of the people who live in these very desolate places, such as North Korea. They, too, have a place in the world democratic movement.

Finally, we face the challenge of finding pluralist solutions to ethnic, national and religious conflicts. And this, of course, is the issue of minority rights that Foreign Minister Geremek raised in his initial presentation.

There is also a problem here that derives from the still-unresolved issues of peoples who were incorporated into former empires that have now collapsed or that have become historical anachronisms and that violate contemporary international norms. What do we do when the controlling states use unrestrained violence to repress such minorities and perhaps to seek their cultural and even physical destruction?

We still live in a dangerous and a violent world and we are in need, as always, of democratic conviction and international solidarity. It is my profound hope that the Warsaw meeting will strengthen our collective resolve to take

effective actions to defend democracy and human rights and to meet the hard challenges of a new century.

Mr. Wolfowitz. We will now open it up for questions and discussion. George Soros is here, so, George, I will call on you to be the first questioner.

Mr. George Soros (*philanthropist and founder of the Soros Foundation*). Well, I should like to support this initiative very heartily. It raises issues with which I am personally very much involved. I would like the conference to be really productive because it's addressing issues that I consider absolutely crucial for the world. So first I would like to comment briefly, if I may, on the intellectual content of Mr. Geremek's presentation.

I would like to offer the concept of "open society," which you sort of circumscribed. You approached it from different sides but you didn't actually use that term "open society," and I think if the conference were to focus in on that word and that concept, it could make a contribution already because you talked about democracy but you pointed out that if people believed that they are in possession of the ultimate truth, then of course democracy doesn't quite fit what we want it to be. And so the "open society" is based on the recognition of our fallibility and so I think, it is a more comprehensive term than "democracy."

You also talked about the role of civil society. There is always a lot of confusion between the concept of civil society and open society. The words are used interchangeably and they shouldn't be, because civil society is an important element of an open society but it's not enough, it's not sufficient. In fact, a government

that is responsive to the demands and needs of the people, a democratic government, is as important as a vibrant civil society.

In a totalitarian regime, civil society is the protector of open society, against the government. But in an open society, civil society has to be interrelated with the government and the government has to be responsive to the needs of society.

And that brings me to the crucial issue, which is the intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign countries in the name of democracy or an open society. And I think this ought to be the central issue to be considered by this conference.

For example, I think there are some very troubling issues raised by the intervention in Kosovo. We have to stress the importance of intervening in a positive way, rather than a punitive way, in the internal affairs of other countries.

So we ought to establish the concept that it is in the interests of open societies to promote the creation of open societies or the development of open societies throughout the world. That is the concept that has been lacking throughout, since the collapse of the Soviet system.

I think Mort mentioned the importance of success in Indonesia and Nigeria, and I entirely share that concern. It has to be a positive reinforcement of developments in that direction and we have to be extremely leery about—but we cannot, of course, exclude—the possibility of punitive intervention. But it should always come after a real effort has been made on the positive side, including our moral justification for intervention.

Mr. Geremek. To my mind, the open society is a concept in which the market economy is included, democracy is included, plus civil society. And so that is a key, key notion.

Mr. Jan Novak (*former vice-president, Polish American Congress*). In my view, nothing contributed better to the enlargement of democracy than admission of some countries to NATO and the prospect for other countries to join NATO and the European Union.

I feel that insecurity is conducive to ethnic conflicts and discrimination against minorities, while a sense of security is conducive to peace and reconciliation between nations.

As a Polish-American, I am very proud of the fact that Poland is not just satisfied in achieving its own security but is also a champion of the further enlargement of NATO, including its neighbors and, of course, for the enlargement of the European Union. And I wonder if these issues should not become really item number one of the conference.

Mr. Geremek. I can say that I agree with Jan Novak. We hope that after Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, the concept of open doors to NATO will be applied as soon as possible. And I can say that Poland will do everything possible in order to obtain the next enlargement of NATO.

I would say, that is the duty of the people. We are grateful to the United States, that we attained not only membership in an alliance but a minimum guarantee of solidarity and the feeling of not being alone. We share the same values and we do have the experience of a long history in which Poland was more than once abandoned and left alone. But we should apply the same criteria now to other countries in the

region. However, I don't think that the conference in Warsaw on democracy can accept as its main concern the question of the enlargement of NATO.

Mr. Halperin. While I agree that the specific issue of NATO enlargement is not on the Warsaw agenda, I think what will be on the agenda is the more general phenomena that countries have increasingly seen the importance of being part of regional and functional and worldwide organizations. And increasingly those organizations are prepared to say that you cannot become a member or remain a member if you violate democratic norms.

We see that most clearly developed in Europe and in Latin America but we are all heartened by the fact that the Organization of African Unity has now said that military regimes that replace democracies will not be welcome at the next meeting of that organization.

I think the goal we want to talk about in Warsaw is how does the worldwide community of democracies strengthen the efforts of regional and functional organizations to impose democracy criteria on membership and use that as a way to encourage countries to move towards democracy and to discourage efforts to move away from it.

Mr. David Jessup (*formerly with the AFL/CIO, now with the New Economy Information Service*). Carl Gershman mentioned the challenge of the global economy and democracy's attitude toward it as a challenge for your conference. I think it's especially a challenge right now because, as we've seen in the events surrounding the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle and, to a certain extent, in the

recent Davos Forum as well, there appears to be a North/South divide on this issue rather than a democratic/authoritarian divide. That is, you see countries like India sort of standing shoulder to shoulder with countries like Cuba on a whole series of issues going from linkage of trade with worker rights and environment, of opening up the WTO process to more civil-society input, to delaying the implementation of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) conventions and preferential trade treatment and a whole host of issues. And that despite the fact that, according to some research we just did, the democratic countries in the developing world seem to be losing market share to the more authoritarian countries when it comes to trade and investment dollars.

So the question to you would be, is this conference going to be an opportunity to set forth a new kind of approach toward the global economy that is some sort of distinctive approach of the democratic countries?

Mr. Geremek. I think that that is a very important issue. We should discuss ways in which democracy can be effective in the economic field. If democracy is not effective in promoting the globalization of the economy, if democracy does not participate in the process of globalization, it will be in danger, and totalitarian regimes will win.

I can say from the Polish experience that very often we asked the question as to whether the Poles or the Chinese were right. The Poles believe that what matters is, first of all, freedom and that one cannot get economic freedom without political freedom.

The Chinese proposal was, and still is, that it's quite possible to introduce economic free-

dom to obtain a very dynamic economy with good results without political freedom. So I think this is one of the issues that should be discussed in the Warsaw conference.

Ambassador Hong-Koo Lee (*South Korean ambassador to the United States*). First of all, let me congratulate Foreign Minister Geremek and the Polish government for hosting this important conference. We are delighted that we will be a party to it.

As you said, in the 20th century, democracy had many objectives. But the most widely held view in our part of the world was that democracy referred to Western democracies. So what is changing now as we go into the new century is that democracy has become something global, not just Western. And in this process, I think everybody has to make a certain adjustment, both intellectually and in an institutional way. And I think this conference may provide a beginning for a very serious effort to really think about what should be the real foundation of global democracy.

And in that connection, I think Mr. Soros' mentioning the open society is very important. Because in some sense we are trying to create an open global economy, open global culture and so on. How this will relate to the individual democracies is a very important issue that we may be able to discuss in Warsaw.

Ms. Yvonne Thayer (*Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor at the State Department*). I would like to just mention another related but separate development of interest to this group. Last spring at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva, there was passed a landmark resolution "Promotion of the Right to Democracy."

The countries there made stunning statements in defense of democracy all across the board, turned back some very hostile amendments by Cuba, and the final vote was 51 in favor, none opposed and only two abstentions—by China and Cuba, which were rather telling.

We pledged at that time that we would get together and follow up with this statement of principles of democracy as part of the U.N. norm-setting process, and it is too good an opportunity to see the co-conveners countries here not to mention that we are just beginning to have some discussions with them on a follow-up resolution, follow-up caucus for Geneva and a follow-up collaboration discussion on what can be done again in this U.N. forum.

Mr. Adrian Karatnycky (*president, Freedom House*). I would like to again thank all of the panelists, particularly the foreign minister, for this excellent exchange of views.

In concluding, I do want to say that not only are the two Warsaw meetings occurring on the eve of the 20th anniversary of Solidarity, which in itself is a justification for this kind of commemoration, but they are occurring at a very important moment in human history.

As many of you know, Freedom House is an organization that tracks the ebb and flow of political processes and democratic change and has been doing so for over a quarter century in our Survey of Freedom in the World. In the last 20 years, we've seen a remarkable expansion of electoral democracy and a slower but no-less-dramatic expansion of freedom and of open societies.

Much of this is a result of concerted and dedicated efforts by governments, by philanthropists, by activists, many of whom are repre-

sented from the American community in this room. From 69 countries out of 170, roughly 40 percent in the middle of the 1980s, to the beginning of the new millennium when over 60 percent of the world's countries have democratically elected governments, we can trace a measure of this dramatic expansion.

Regrettably, the number of people who live in what would be called open societies or liberal democracies has trailed that more dramatic expansion of electoral democracy. But we very much hope that the Warsaw meeting will be an important new stimulus for deepening democratic changes in these less-free societies and devising new mechanisms in which private and public groups and governments can work in a concerted effort to expand democracy in the new millennium.

Note: The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.

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Democracy Promotion: A Key Focus in a New World Order

by Thomas Carothers

Americans always have had a strong interest in promoting democracy, especially as their country assumed an increasingly important role on the world stage. President Woodrow Wilson, who pledged to make the world safe for democracy, was clearly a man ahead of his time. In this thought-provoking piece focusing on democracy promotion in the last years of the 20th century, Thomas Carothers, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*, examines where we are headed and looks at how Wilson's original call has been transformed into a national policy upon the world stage.

SINCE THE MID-1980S especially, democracy assistance has become a significant element of U.S. foreign aid and foreign policy. By the end of the 1990s, the U.S. government was spending over \$700 million a year on democracy aid in approximately 100 countries—primarily through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Asia Foundation and the Eurasia Foundation.

Although the current wave of democracy programs has forerunners—the Marshall Plan of the early post-World War II period, for example, and the political development or “modernization” programs of the 1960s—the current effort is the most extensive, systematic commitment the United States has ever undertaken to foster democracy around the world.



Thomas Carothers

And the U.S. is not alone. Other countries, especially the prosperous democracies of Western Europe as well as a myriad of international institutions supported by many governments, also have embarked on a major effort to support democracy, especially in transitional countries that have recently embarked on the arduous process of renouncing totalitarian and authoritarian forms of rule.

This effort is a response to two major political developments: first, the acceleration of a global trend toward democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s, which pushed democracy to the top of the international policy agenda and challenged democratic countries to respond; and second, the end of the Cold War, which lowered barriers to international political cooperation and nudged U.S. foreign policy away from its primary anti-Communist focus to a greater emphasis on support for democracy as an end in itself.

To be sure, the U.S. commitment to democracy is not total. The country, like all countries,

still has security and economic interests that sometimes conflict with the goal of supporting democracy. But as many U.S. officials have stated during the last decade, this is now much less an issue than it was during the Cold War when the U.S.—necessarily in the view of some—developed alliances with undemocratic regimes because of security needs deriving from the competition with the Soviet Union.

The Core Strategy

The U.S. strategy for supporting democracy in the post-Cold War era initially rested on three interrelated instincts: first, using American democracy as a model or template; second, viewing democratization as a process of “institutional modeling” in which the democratizing country attempts to reproduce the forms of institutions of established democracies; and third, assuming that democratization consists of a natural, orderly sequence of stages.

As these instincts have collided with the realities of political transitions, the strategy has begun to evolve and mature. Some American democracy promoters now rely less on an American model. They import information and ideas from other established democracies or from successful new democracies that have proven particularly relevant. They sometimes try to help other societies develop democratic forms particular to the country’s own history and culture.

Increasingly, democracy promoters acknowledge the need to take account of the underlying interests and power relations in which institutions are embedded. Democratic change must be understood not as the reproduction of institutional endpoints, but as the achievement of a

set of political processes that help engender a democratic culture.

At the same time, democracy promoters are facing the fact that democratic transitions often do not follow an orderly sequence. They are, increasingly, designing democracy aid portfolios to fit these various contexts rather than assuming a natural sequence. There is no magic strategy that fits all countries.

Although the menu of democracy aid programs is essentially the same today as 15 years ago—with three main categories of programs aimed at elections, state institutions and civil society—emphasis has shifted among these categories. Electoral aid has declined now that the phase of breakthrough elections is largely over.

Aid to civil society is now much more prominent, because of growing enthusiasm for the idea and a certain disillusionment with over-concentration on aid to state institutions. Nevertheless, the tripartite democracy template still dominates; most changes reflect the evolution of approaches within each of the specific areas:

Elections

This component of democracy promotion has undergone major change. Election observing has become much more sophisticated, and aid to improve the administration of elections has become a well-developed, subfield of its own. Still, many bad elections continue to be held in transitional countries, even when administrative support is provided and observers are present.

Democracy promoters realized over and over again during the 1990s that elections do not equal democracy. There still is a large

amount of assistance to political parties, but resources are increasingly allocated to the development of parties, and to using experts familiar with non-American settings. Despite the efforts to date, in most transitional countries, political parties remain among the feeblest links in the democratization chain.

Non-Executive Bodies

Programs to support the reform of judiciaries, legislatures and other state institutions—organized around the idea of strengthening the non-executive branches of top-heavy governments—constitute the largest of the three main categories of democracy aid. Learning has been slow in this area, and democracy promoters have had a hard time giving up their fixed models and mechanistic notions about how to foster change in large institutions.

Aid providers are increasingly realizing that the will to reform must exist in state institutions, if change is to occur. They are also beginning to accept that resistance to reform in at least some levels of any given state institution is more the rule than the exception. The realization that institutional reform requires deeper changes among the interest structures and power relationships, is a necessary insight and underscores how slow and difficult change will be.

Civil Society

Democracy promoters' growing emphasis on civil society is itself part of the learning curve; they are seeking to go beyond elections and state institutions, to turn democratic forms into democratic substance. Much of the first wave of civil society aid has supported nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) devoted to public

interest advocacy. With experience, however, democracy promoters are taking a harder look at the NGO world.

They are pushing themselves and their recipients on the issues of representativity and sustainability, and expanding the range of NGO advocacy they are willing to underwrite. As they log experience with civil society work, democracy promoters are discovering that although civil society is a highly accessible place of entry for democracy aid, it is also a vast and complicated component of democracy that is not easily fostered.

Looking at the three main categories of democracy assistance, differences in effects are visible but not dramatic. The effects of all the types of programs are often diffuse and indirect, much more so than the rationalistic approaches of democracy promoters might imply. The programs are directed at institutions and organizations but affect individuals, their greatest impact often being the transmission of ideas that will change people's behavior in other settings at other times.

Localism

Democracy aid stumbles most often in the implementation phase. Democracy promoters have failed in many cases to develop a sophisticated understanding of the societies in which they function, content with the misguided idea that their knowledge of democracy alone is sufficient basis for the fostering of democracy. Too often they have tried to become the agents of political change in transitional societies, treating local partners as mere assistants. Countless projects have foundered for lack of real ownership in recipient countries.

The good news, however, is that implementation is gradually improving, largely because of a greater recognition of the importance of localism—working through and with local officials and organizations that more fully understand local conditions. This has been hard work, however, and has been only partially successful to date.

Democracy promoters also have been slow to give up the belief that democracy can be promoted in a one-size-fits-all manner, and the belief that democracy promotion can be segregated from traditional development aid. Moreover, they have too often shied away from more localism out of fear of losing control over the aid they are providing. A new mindset is needed: Democracy building is not something “we” do to “them” but something people in other countries do, sometimes with our help.

Evaluation of Democracy Promotion Programs

Of the many facets of democracy aid, evaluation has advanced least. Democracy programs present a challenge for evaluators because of the difficulty of agreeing on precise criteria of success in the political domain and of establishing clear causal links between specific projects and larger political trends.

In most cases during the 1990s, democracy promoters either did not evaluate their programs at all or commissioned superficial evaluations by investigators lacking real independence. However, in recent years, aid providers have begun to take the subject of evaluations more seriously even though they are exceedingly complex to effectively conduct, because the effects of democracy programs may not be fully

apparent for years and must be judged in the context of prevailing social, economic and political conditions.

For this reason, aid providers must give up the notion that the effects of democracy aid can be measured with calculators. They must accept the notion that in-depth qualitative analysis is the only way to gain an understanding of political events and effects, and that many of the most important results of democracy programs are psychological, moral, subjective, indirect and time-delayed.

The most important point, however, is that democracy promoters must develop a full understanding of the political realities in the societies they are trying to assist. Progress along the learning curve is then not simply a matter of concentration on technical lessons and the accumulation of experience. In a fundamental sense, democracy promoters must challenge their own ideas about politics and come to terms with how much or how little they really know about political change in other societies.

They also must challenge their own methods of operation, asking hard questions about what imperatives actually shape their programming and how they can improve their practices. All components of the learning curve are important, but not equally so. One deserves special attention: developing good methods of implementation. The knowledge of what constitutes good methods of implementation is already available and can make a major difference in any project.

Three broader issues also merit greater attention. First, democracy promoters should push to build a relationship between aid for

democracy and the larger, more established world of aid for social and economic development. Much work remains to be done just in identifying the critical connections between economic and political phenomena.

Second, democracy promoters should give greater attention to the role of women in democratization. Although training efforts directed at women are often unable to overcome underlying power structures and constraints, it is impossible not to be struck by the unusually intense interest and enthusiasm that democracy programs relating to women often generate.

Third, democracy promoters have a responsibility, still largely unmet, to help governments and citizens of transitional countries understand democracy aid and become more than passive recipients. Transparency and publicity are essential if citizens are to understand, participate in, and truly benefit from such aid.

The Future of Democracy Promotion

The democratic gains in the world during the past two decades have been substantial. Yet the challenges that lie ahead for those committed to aiding democracy abroad remain monumental. It still is sobering to note the number of countries where democracy is fading, failing or still nonexistent.

The analysis of democracy aid presented here highlights a central cautionary lesson: No dramatic or quick results should be expected from democracy promotion efforts, especially in the case of those countries where the mix of economic, social and political forces remains hostile to the development of democracy.

Democracy aid, as well as the complementary tools of diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks, can do little to change the fundamental social, economic and political structures and conditions that shape political life in other countries.

Accepting that most democracy promotion efforts do not bring about rapid or decisive change does not imply that the United States—and other countries and organizations—should downgrade or abandon their commitment to advancing democracy abroad. It means that democracy promotion must be approached as a long-term, uncertain venture.

Policy makers must be prepared to stick to the goal for decades, to weather reversals, and to find ways to question and criticize their own methods as they proceed with what is clearly a noble endeavor. The challenge, in short, is to build into the commitment a cautious, realistic understanding of capabilities. Basing a call for a democracy-oriented foreign policy on an assumption of vast American influence over other countries' political fortunes only sets up the policy edifice for a fall.

Americans are too used to debating foreign policy from positions of realism and idealism, in which America's interests and capabilities are either systematically understated or overstated. A position based on idealistic aspirations tempered by deeply realist considerations is uncomfortable. For democracy promotion, however, it is the only real choice.

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
Sovereignty and Human Rights: The Search for Reconciliation

by Richard Falk

Richard Falk, professor of international law and practice at Princeton University, discusses the complicated relationship between national sovereignty and human rights in an article that raises important questions about the degree to which democracy should be promoted around the world. As Professor Falk indicates, the choices are by no means easy or clear.

THE INTERNATIONAL protection of human rights is difficult to separate from the ebb and flow of great power relations. Human rights, and its war-like step-child, “humanitarian intervention,” are both core elements of post-Cold War geopolitics. As such, both the projections of power on behalf of severe human rights abuses and the refusal to take action in the face of humanitarian catastrophes suggest how deeply human rights is embedded in contemporary geopolitics. The extreme instances of refusals to act are illustrated by reference to Rwanda (1994) where strategic interests were perceived to be minimal, and Chechnya (1999–2000) where the costs and risks of action were perceived to be too great.

Often, the counter to the internationalization of human rights is the doctrine of sovereignty, which on its face seems to preclude the implementation by external coercion of human rights standards. States that were colonies until recently, as well as countries that experienced



Richard Falk

frequent interventions, tend to be particularly eager to insist that implementation of human rights must occur in a manner that is consistent with strict notions of sovereignty. The U.N. Charter by its affirmation in Article 2(7) that the organization is prohibited from intervening in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of member states, seems also to be reassuring members that the United Nations will not challenge internal state/society relations, no matter what degree of chaos or abuse occurs, at least so long as no threat to international peace and security is present.

The Increasing Importance of the Human Rights Ethos

At the same time, the emergence of a serious human rights process at regional and global levels would seem to be the most impressive ethical achievement of the past century. The funda-

mental idea that governments must act within certain prescribed limits—that even political and military leaders might be held accountable for their actions if they amount to crimes against humanity and severe patterns of human rights abuse—represents revolutionary developments. These emergent international standards, and their implementation, are definitely challenging the idea that sovereignty provides governments with insulation against accountability provided that their actions are confined to territorial limits, and that their leaders have an immunity respected throughout the world. The pursuit of such notable figures as Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, suggests that those responsible for inflicting horror on citizens have no longer any secure place to hide in the world. The related effort to establish a permanent international criminal court, in accordance with the Rome Treaty of 1998, seeks to give institutional solidity to this extension of accountability.

Perhaps most notably, the significance of human rights is a consequence of pressures mounted by activists in civil society. The rise of international human rights expressed new modes of transnational political action, relying on networks, norms, information and media access as instruments of persuasion, to challenge entrenched oppressive state power. At times, these challenges converged with geopolitical pressures as was the case in relation to support for human rights in former Soviet bloc countries, and currently in China. Cold War ideology and the promotion of human rights converged, especially in the 1980s. As Noam Chomsky and others have pointed out, they also often diverged, with geopolitical priorities pro-

ducing pro-authoritarian interventions at the expense of human rights. This was especially the case in relation to Third World countries, particularly throughout Latin America during the Cold War era, featuring such recurrent interventions as in Guatemala (1954), Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1973), and Nicaragua and El Salvador (1980s). A similar pattern of Western support for authoritarian rule was evident in relation to Africa and Asia as well.

The main point is that sovereignty and human rights are linked in complex, contradictory ways. Sovereignty can serve as a shield and pretext to enable a government to engage in abusive behavior toward its own citizenry. At the same time, however, it can also protect a progressive government that is committed to promoting the economic, social and cultural well-being of its people against a geopolitically motivated intervention that seeks to exert pressure on a weaker state. Because of this dual nature of sovereignty, with its many variations, the issues raised about the relations between sovereignty and human rights in any particular case should always be considered in their broader context. At this stage of development in international society, sovereignty may work for or against human rights depending upon the circumstances.

The Evolution of the Human Rights Movement

The preliminary puzzle is why sovereign states would participate in the creation of a legal framework that by its very nature is subversive of territorial supremacy, which was the hallmark of Westphalian era (1648) world order. In the period after World War II starting with the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention, this dynamic of subversion was initiated. It can be best explained by two mutually reinforcing sets of considerations: First of all, an awareness of the historical circumstances surrounding the exposure of atrocities by Nazi Germany generated pressures to create conditions that would work against the repetition of such behavior in the future. The fact that what the Nazi regime did to its own citizenry had generated such a passive response on the part of Western liberal democracies was part of this awareness, giving rise to the pledge of “never again.” Such a resolve was associated with the foundational idea that there were limits on what a government could do in its relations with the people living within its boundaries. In one sense, the elaboration of fundamental human rights amounted to a specification of these universal limits on territorial supremacy, thereby exhibiting post-1945 Western guilt combined with reformist and idealist values that had provided the ideological rationale for the recently concluded war.

There was also present, however, a second set of considerations of a neutralizing character. The world of 1945 remained a state-centric world with very different ideas about how to organize state/society relations. It was also a world characterized by grossly varied material circumstances. Such unevenness may have been just below the surface of political consciousness in the immediate aftermath of World War II, but it was latent even during the war. Subsequently, the Cold War with its East/West axis and the anti-colonial struggle with its North/South tensions highlighted the lack of consensus in international society.

As a result, from the very outset, the possibility of human rights implementation was problematical. There was no enforcement mechanism associated with the formulation of a human rights framework. Real power was still distributed at the level of the state. In effect, the emergence of human rights was politically possible only because there existed at the time an understanding that there would be no mechanisms of implementation brought into being. Even authoritarian states had no trouble subscribing to the norms laid down since there was virtually no chance they would be maintained. In this sense, the subversion of sovereignty was more apparent than real.

And yet, with the passage of time, this understanding shifted: The subversion in several key settings became real as well as apparent. Several factors explain this unanticipated course of events. The emergence of effective transnational NGOs dedicated to the promotion and implementation of human rights introduced a new set of non-state political actors onto the global stage. With the norms of human rights having been legitimated by governments, the claims for implementation by these NGOs were difficult to discount altogether, especially when joined with grassroots opposition to oppressive rule and to an awareness of abuse made manifest by a gradually more attentive global media. Sovereignty was indeed being penetrated in the sense that selectively, at least, the shield against external accountability was being evaded to some extent. As suggested earlier, the effectiveness of this penetration was enhanced to the extent that it converged with ongoing ideological struggles: The West joined with NGOs to exert pressures on Soviet bloc countries, especially after the Helsinki Accords of 1975,

while the Third World made use of the United Nations General Assembly and its own Non-Aligned Movement to lend political weight to the promotion of the right of self-determination as validating struggles against colonial rule. This latter process culminated in the Anti-Apartheid Campaign that managed to build such a strong normative climate in favor of human rights that in the 1980s it overcame the inclinations of conservative leaders such as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who were guardians of the strategic economic and political interests of the United States and the United Kingdom, which seemed to favor preserving the status quo. In these high-profile instances of the collapse of the Soviet bloc (and the ending of the Cold War), the triumph of decolonization, and the defeat of apartheid in South Africa, the advocacy of human rights on an international level contributed to a historically important, and generally welcome, set of substantive outcomes, none of which were anticipated by earlier realist calculations.

The Scope of the Human Rights Movement

Against this background, the conceptual issues emerge more clearly and pertain to both poles of inquiry, affecting our sense of sovereignty as well as our understanding of human rights. With respect to sovereignty, there are two crucial ambiguities: The prevailing view of sovereignty is as a status and condition of governance relating to the idea of territorial supremacy, which places the forced implementation of international human rights on a collision course with sovereignty. But if sovereignty is understood as inhering in the people, the idea of pop-

ular sovereignty that has been historically associated with the French Revolution, then in many situations the realization of human rights is precisely the political project being espoused by “the sovereign” (i.e., the people). Even if sovereignty is associated with the state as a representative of the people, particularly a democratic state, then it is still possible to conceive of sovereignty as a bundle of rights and duties that can be modified by the lawmaking powers of the state, thereby creating the possibility that the acceptance of human rights, even with the prospect of some external accountability, is a fulfillment of sovereignty under contemporary conditions. Such a viewpoint seems especially applicable within the framework of the regional protection of human rights within Europe by way of the Court of Human Rights, and to a lesser extent, within the Inter-American System. In effect, the acceptance of external accountability for human rights occurs within a setting in which democratic states seek to safeguard a democratic and liberal future even against anti-democratic and anti-liberal forces within their own country. That is, sovereignty relinquishes a measure of territorial control in exchange for greater assurance that a desirable regional and national political climate can be maintained in the future. For instance, surely, as an expression of sovereignty, it might be acceptable to forego the domestic option of selecting fascist rule. The response to the inclusion of Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party in the governing Austrian coalition tested the relative strength of these two contrasting conceptions of sovereignty. On the one side, are those who suggested that the outcome of an Austrian election and inter-party bargaining process was a matter for Austria alone to determine, essentially with-

out limits. On the other side, is the view that the governments of the EU have accepted limits on their internal public order based on a shared commitment to human rights and democracy, and that the Haider presence in government would endanger that commitment.

There is an equally important debate concerning the scope and character of human rights. If one approaches the issue of scope from the perspective of international law texts, then there is no doubt about the inclusion of the right of self-determination and the range of economic, social and cultural rights in the Covenant devoted to this subject matter. Yet if one considers the transnational politics of human rights, it has been overwhelmingly preoccupied with civil and political rights, and with a narrow band of such rights. Only recently has this narrow operative conception of human rights been put under scrutiny.

The U.S. and Human Rights

A final conceptual confusion is associated with the manner in which the U.S. government has positioned itself with respect to human rights. The U.S. government more than any other has associated its foreign policy with a commitment to human rights, a position that reached its climax in the early years of the Carter presidency. Only the U.S. government publishes an annual survey of the human rights records (narrowly conceived) of countries receiving foreign economic assistance, an internal legal obligation imposed on the executive branch by Congress. At the same time, the United States has been slow to accept formally the binding obligations of several major human rights treaties, invoking difficulties arising from its federal structure,

from the historic suspicions of its Southern states, and from its insistence that the stability and quality of its democratic political order needs no reinforcement from without. But in the background, beyond doubt, is the more territorial view of sovereignty that makes the United States government and its citizenry less enthusiastic about any external process of assessment. This issue arose recently, for example, when a rather low-profile inquiry into the practice of capital punishment in the United States conducted by the U.N. Human Rights Commission provoked a storm of resentment from some quarters.

There is, finally, a question of how the United Nations has shifted the balance between a respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights. The last several secretaries general of the U.N. have all advocated a more intrusive approach, eroding the domestic jurisdiction limitation on U.N. authority. The issue is most sharply posed by severe patterns of abuse that generate calls for U.N. sponsored "humanitarian intervention." Recent instances of Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and Chechnya illustrate both the impulse to intervene and the geopolitical limitations on intervention. Among the factors that need to be taken into account are the following: capacity to address the situation at acceptable levels of risk to the intervener; the degree of commitment to the well-being of the victims associated with the relationship between the intervener and the society in question; and the kinds and depth of interests at stake. From such a perspective, it is easy to grasp the low degree of political will associated with Rwanda (no interests) and Chechnya (too high risks), and the high degree connected with Bosnia, and even more so with Kosovo (the

European neighborhood, the fear of wider Balkan War, the mobilization of public opinion, the viability of NATO after the Cold War).

Conclusion

It is evident that the spectrum of accepted meanings associated with both sovereignty and human rights establishes a domain of ambiguity that enables political actors with contradictory values and goals to invoke either or both poles for their instrumental purposes. It is important to be aware of such tendencies in international relations without losing sight of three dominant empirical trends: first of all, the international and transnational emergence of human rights in multiple forms as an increasingly important issue area; secondly, the dynamics of de-territorialization of political life, thereby eroding the reliability of boundaries; thirdly, the greater capabilities of states in the post-colonial era to uphold territorial security in the face of interventionary diplomacy (State sovereignty is currently a reality for most countries, including those in the Third World.).

Part of the confusion associated with the intertwined discourses addressing sovereignty and human rights arises from a failure to distinguish symbolic from substantive or functional politics. Sovereignty is symbolically very much associated with the assertion of the "self" connected with self-determination, and the politics of identity as practiced within the confines of the sovereign state. Such a symbolic attachment is not at odds with various engagements with external actors on the basis of shared values and common interests, which is an exercise of sovereignty although it may result in restricting

the discretion of the state. Similarly with human rights. Their symbolic affirmation may be associated with an ideological orientation, while substantively, the implementation of human rights may threaten entrenched social, economic, political and culture structures of privilege and domination.

For all these reasons, it is particularly important to deconstruct the sovereignty/human rights debate in relation to who, whom, for what, that is, identifying claims, actors, interests and values in context. Complexity will remain, but at least there will be less of a tendency to conduct the debate in a manipulative manner that obscures the real play of forces, and makes it virtually impossible to assess the consequences of alternative courses of action.

Note: The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.

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Democracy: A Right of All Nations

by Joshua Muravchik

Is democracy for everyone? To Americans, the answer is axiomatic. Our own democracy rests on the propositions that “all men are created equal [and] are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights” and that “governments deriv[e] their just power from the consent of the governed.” These, says the American Declaration of Independence, are “truths” which are “self-evident.” They are, of course, nothing of the sort. No government before had ever been based on them. Rather they were professions of faith or first principles. They could not be proven, but expressed the fundamental notion of justice held by America’s founders. Expounding on this theory, Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and the author of *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny*, looks at the concept of “universal democracy” and defines its parameters and challenges.

NOTHING IN the Declaration said that these principles applied only to Americans. On the contrary, they aimed to describe principles of just government applicable to “all men.” This universality has been vindicated by the success with which the American polity has absorbed millions of immigrants of ethnic origins quite different from those of its founders, as well as America’s own emancipated slaves. As the nation has grown polyglot, democracy has not weakened, but rather grown steadily more robust. Americans who believe in our own democracy, and the reasons the founders gave for it, must necessarily believe as well that people in other countries are endowed with the same rights and that governments everywhere ought to rest on the consent of the governed.

Challenges to Democratic Universalism

But this characteristically American, universalistic conviction has not seemed “self-evident”



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to everyone. For example, the representatives of Asian governments who gathered in Bangkok in 1993 for a regional meeting preparatory to the U.N. World Conference on Human Rights declared that “all countries...have the right to determine their [own] political systems,” including, by implication, systems that are undemocratic. And they asserted that human rights “must be considered in the context of...national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.” Although the language was turgid, as it often is in diplomatic pronouncements, the point was clear: Democracy might not be good for everyone. The Bangkok declaration lent implicit support to the idea of an “Asian way” that puts the group ahead of the individual, and that pursues economic development by means of authoritarian governance. Analogous points have sometimes been made about the peoples of other regions, for example, that Middle Easterners prefer political systems based on Islamic precepts or that Latin Americans find

some kind of corporative populism more congenial than “mechanical” democracy.

There is also a second line of argument that challenges democratic universalism from a different direction. Various American scholars have questioned whether the people of poor or non-Western countries are capable of governing themselves. The writer Irving Kristol put it: “I am not one who is thrilled by the success of democracy in Argentina or in the Philippines or...Korea.... I will lay odds that democracy will not survive in those countries” because they lack “the preconditions of democracy...certain ...traditions [and] cultural attitudes.” The point, in this view, is not that there is a better alternative to democracy, but rather that it may not be attainable. As political scientist James Q. Wilson has written: “Democracy and human freedom are good for everyone.... But the good they bring can only be appreciated when people are calm and tolerance is accepted.” This is not the case, he suggests, in China, Russia, most of Africa and the Middle East or much of Latin America. Kristol and Wilson are conservatives, but the same view has been adopted by many liberal scholars, too. For example, political scientist Robert Dahl wrote: “It is a disagreeable, perhaps even tragic, fact that in much of the world the conditions most favorable to the development and maintenance of democracy are non-existent, or at best only weakly present.”

Let us consider each of these two objections to democratic universalism. The claim that every country has a right to its own system begs the question, who speaks for the country? Amartya Sen, the Indian economist who won the 1998 Nobel prize, put it, the “justification for authoritarian political arrangements in Asia ...have typically come not from independent

historians but from the authorities themselves.” Because such arguments are obviously self-serving, they are usually presented in the name of the people. “The Chinese people” or “the people of Singapore,” or wherever it may be, do not want democracy, we are told. Aside from the irony in this (Why, apart from democratic premises, does it matter what the people want?), there is also the question of how can we know what they want unless we ask them?

Rulers often say they know what their subjects want, but why should such claims be accepted? In the American South in the 1950s, white spokesmen often insisted that “our colored” were content with racial segregation. But once the right to vote was secured for blacks, the segregationists were thoroughly repudiated.

Around the world, there have been numerous cases in which people living under dictatorship were finally given a chance to express their will, and the results have never vindicated the dictators. Ordinarily this has occurred when the incumbent regime felt itself under pressure and therefore arranged an election under terms favorable to itself in the hope of hanging onto power. In 1977, when protests mounted against the system of martial law that Indira Gandhi had imposed in India, she agreed to call an election, believing it would give her a vote of confidence. In an impoverished country like India, she reasoned, her economic promises would count for more than political rights. Instead, the election swept her from office, and the opposition was led by the party of the “untouchables,” the poorest of the poor. In 1987, Ferdinand Marcos called a “snap election” in the Philippines, giving the opposition little time to organize, but he, too, was defeated.

The next year in Chile, President Augusto Pinochet, not willing to risk a competitive election, agreed instead to a plebiscite on continuing his rule. The idea was to give the voters a choice between the status quo or an unknown future, which was bound to seem insecure. Nonetheless, the majority voted “No” to Pinochet’s continuance. In 1989, the Polish regime and the opposition agreed to hold a semi-competitive election. Many legislative seats were to be contested, but the full slate of top Communist officials was to run without opposition, so as to preserve their ascendance. The people, however, ruined the scheme. Although there were no alternative candidates, the majority of voters crossed out the names of the ruling bigwigs. They may have been the only candidates in history to run unopposed and still lose. In 1990, as dictatorial regimes were tumbling around the world, the military rulers of Burma were confronted with massive street demonstrations. Soldiers killed a great many protestors, but finally the rulers agreed to hold that country’s first election in nearly 30 years. The National League for Democracy won more than 80 percent of the vote, but tragically the military oligarchy has refused to honor the results.

Preference for Democracy

Many more such examples could be cited. In contrast, where are the examples of dictators who have won free elections approving their rule? When has a people ever voted to relinquish its democratic rights? To be sure, there are cases where freely elected leaders have refused to relinquish power, in effect turning

themselves into dictators, but in none of these cases had an intention been acknowledged when the man was running for office. It is true, too, that one-time Communists have been voted back into power in several of the states of the former Soviet bloc. But none of these candidates has proposed to restore one-party rule. Rather, they have based their appeals on social and economic issues, while affirming their acceptance of democratic procedures.

The two most recent cases in which a people living under authoritarian rule has demonstrated its preference for democracy are Indonesia and Iran. Student demonstrations brought down General Suharto's regime in 1998, and subsequent elections dealt a devastating defeat to the former ruling party, Golkar. Iran has yet to hold fully free elections. Only candidates who pledge support for the Islamic system and are approved by clerical authorities are allowed to run. Nonetheless, parliamentary elections this year demonstrated clearly the popular will for greater democracy. These events contain an element of poetic justice, since Iran and Indonesia were two of the states most active at the Bangkok conference in making the case that Asian people did not welcome international standards of democracy and human rights.

Another variant of this argument that some nations do not want democracy is exemplified in the following quote from the American scholar Howard Wiarda, a specialist on Latin America. "I doubt that Latin America wants ...democracy U.S.-style." This makes it sound as if the question is not whether democracy is a universally applicable value, but rather whether every country should have a political

system cut from the same mold, namely, the American mold. This is a false issue. Why should any other country want democracy "U.S.-style?" The American system, with its peculiar checks and balances, its powerful, oddly apportioned Senate, its division of powers between state and federal governments, its two dominant parties, etc., grew out of the American experience. Other democracies have parliamentary systems, unitary governments, multi-party elections, proportional representation, unicameral legislatures and a multitude of other such variations. When the Allied occupiers were creating democracy in Japan after World War II, they briefly tried to impose a federal system, but it was so alien to Japanese traditions, that it did not stick. Every democracy is unique, and there are many possible institutional forms.

This is not to say, however, that everything that calls itself democratic deserves the name. Over the years, many Communist or other revolutionary regimes and movements, called themselves "democratic" because they claimed to be devoted to the well-being of the people, even though they had not been chosen in an election. But in the last years of the Soviet Union, President Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged that this had not been a proper use of the term democracy. "We know today," he said, "that we would have been able to avoid many...difficulties if the democratic process had developed normally in our country." By this he meant, as he said, "representative, parliamentary democracy."

Determining What Is a Democracy

Because the term has been misused, it is important to identify the basic characteristics that determine whether a country is, or is not, a democracy. These boil down to three things. First, the principal government officials must be chosen in free and fair elections. This means anyone can run for office and everyone can vote. Of course, there may be minor derogations from this, but not major ones. South Africa under apartheid held competitive elections, but blacks could not vote. That was not democracy. Iran has an elected president and legislature, but many candidates were barred by clerical authorities, and all elected officials are subordinate to non-elected religious councils. That is not democracy.

Second, freedom of expression must be allowed, namely, freedom of speech, press, assembly and the like. Again, minor derogations may be of little importance, but a state like Serbia, where the means of mass communication are mostly monopolized by the regime and the few independent newspapers and broadcasters are subjected to legal and physical harassment, is not a democracy even though it has held competitive elections.

Third, rule of law must prevail. When a person has been charged with a crime, he should have reason to be confident that his case will be tried on its merits and not according to orders handed to the judge by political authorities. Likewise, when a citizen suffers mistreatment at the hands of an official, there should be some legal avenue by which he can seek a remedy. Thus Malaysia cannot be considered democratic even though it recently held an

election, because the leader of the opposition has been held in prison on charges which were surely instigated by the president.

Let us now turn to the second challenge to democratic universalism, namely the argument of thinkers like Kristol, Wilson and Dahl that democracy, though desirable, is beyond the capabilities of poor or non-Western people.

This argument is not of recent vintage. A similar skepticism was expressed a few decades ago about the democratic capabilities of societies that we are now accustomed to thinking of as firmly democratic. For example, as World War II drew to a close, President Harry Truman commissioned a briefing from the U.S. State Department's leading expert on Japan about what to do with that country once it was defeated. The expert, Joseph Grew, told him that "from the long-range point of view, the best we can hope for is a constitutional monarchy, experience having shown that democracy in Japan would never work." Likewise, when the Western occupation of West Germany ended in 1952, the eminent political scientist Hans Eulau toured that country and wrote despairingly that "The Bonn Republic seems like a second performance of Weimar...giv[ing] rise to the same old, vague forebodings." The problem, Eulau explained, is that "German politics is...grounded not on democratic experience but on a deep emotionalism."

When Italy turned to fascism in the 1920s, the historian Arnold Toynbee wrote that "her repudiation of 'democracy' (in our conventional use of the term) has made it an open question whether this political plant can really strike permanent root anywhere except in its native soil," by which he meant England and America.

But even in America doubts used to be raised about the political capacity of some of the citizens. As Senator Strom Thurmond explained to the Harvard Law School in 1957: "Many Negroes simply lack sufficient political consciousness to...participate in political and civic affairs...a great number probably also lack certain other qualities prerequisite to casting a truly intelligent ballot."

The argument that democracy requires a democratic tradition is circular. How do you acquire a democratic tradition except by practicing democracy? The answer, the skeptics would say, is that democracy in the West grew out of certain ideas in the Western tradition that can be traced all the way back to classical antiquity. But Amartya Sen has an interesting rejoinder to this. He points out that the Western tradition contains diverse elements. The roots of democracy can be traced to ancient Greece, but Greek philosophers also approved slavery. Modern democracy drew on certain elements from the Western tradition while rejecting others. By the same token, Sen enumerates liberal elements that can be found in Buddhist, Confucian, Kautilyan, Islamic and ancient Indian thought, and he asks why these cannot be drawn upon as a cultural basis for democracy in the non-Western world.

Although we sense that culture is an important determinant of politics, the relationship is hard to specify. Political scientist Samuel Huntington has reminded us that a few decades ago all predominantly Confucian societies were poor, and social scientists argued that something in the behaviors inspired by Confucian beliefs kept them poor. Since then, Confucian societies have experienced faster economic growth than Christian or Muslim soci-

eties have ever done. Now, social scientists are trying to understand what it is about Confucian beliefs that generates wealth.

Is Universal Democracy Desirable?

The most telling rebuttal to those who doubt the democratic capacity of poor or non-Western peoples is the experience of recent decades. According to the most authoritative account, which is the annual "survey of freedom" conducted by the private organization, Freedom House, last year 120 out of the world's 192 countries had democratically elected governments. This amounted to 62.5 percent of the countries, comprising 58.2 percent of the world's population. There were 20 electoral democracies in Africa and 14 in Asia, not counting the small Asian-Pacific island states, among which there were another 11 democracies. Needless to say, these non-Western democracies include a great number of poor countries. Of course it is true that poverty, illiteracy and social tensions make the practice of democracy more difficult. It may well be that some of the fledgling democracies that Freedom House counted this year will revert to dictatorship, just as most Western European states achieved democracy through episodes of progress and regress rather than all at once. But the weight of historical experience argues that the social and cultural obstacles are not insuperable. Considering that the first, quite imperfect democracy was created in 1776 and that now, 224 years later, there are 120 democracies, the striking thing is how far democracy has spread, not how limited it is.

If all of this goes to show that universal democracy is indeed possible, is it desirable? I believe it is. First, it will make for a more peaceful world. Democracies do not fight one another. A great deal of research has been devoted to this observation since it was first pointed out 10 or 15 years ago, and today it stands, in the words of one scholar, “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.” There is dispute about whether democracies are more peaceful, *per se*, or only more peaceful toward other democracies. But either way, if more of the world becomes democratic, war will become less common.

In addition to this “democratic peace,” Sen has advanced another proposition about democracies to which no one has yet offered a confuting instance. He says that no democracy has ever experienced a famine or comparable calamity. The reason, he says, is that famines are preventable. In political systems that include the “feedback” mechanisms that are inherent in democracy, governments are alerted when famine conditions are building and they act to assuage them before they reach disastrous proportions.

These are strong instrumental reasons in favor of democracy. But, to me, perhaps because I am an American, the strongest reason is not instrumental. I believe that every adult ought to have a voice in his government, if he wants it. This is part of my conception of human dignity, whether or not democratic governments make wise decisions. Individuals do not always make wise decisions in their private lives, for example, in choosing a career or a spouse. But I believe it is better for them to be free to make their own choices and errors, than for others to

control their lives. The same, in my view, applies to the public arena. I cannot prove I am right. This is not a provable proposition, but a matter of core values. Yet, judging from the spread of democracy around the world, these values are shared by a great many people whose experiences are quite different from my own.

Note: The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Endowment conducts programs of research, discussion, publication, and education in international affairs and U.S. foreign policy.

<http://www.ceip.org/>

Commission on Human Rights

U.S. Sponsored Round Table on Strengthening Democracy

<http://www.humanrights-usa.net/demotab.html>

Community of Democracies: Ministerial Meeting, Warsaw Poland, June 26-27, 2000

http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/democracy/cdi_index.html

Community of Democracies: Official Polish Government Site

<http://www.msz.gov.pl/CDConference>

Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

<http://endgenocide.org/text.htm>

European Court of Human Rights

<http://www.echr.coe.int/>

Freedom House

Freedom House is a vigorous advocate for democracy and human rights worldwide. Freedom House's work includes an array of research, advocacy, and publications to promote human rights, democracy, free market economics, the rule of law, independent media, and U.S. engagement abroad.

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>

Inter-American Court for Human Rights

<http://www.l.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/general.htm>

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED)

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit, grant-making organization created to strengthen democratic institutions around the world.

<http://www.ned.org/>

National League for Democracy (NLD)

The NLD is Burma's leading political party. The NLD won over 80 per cent of the seats in Burma's 1990 Parliamentary elections but has not yet been allowed to seat a government.

<http://www.burmafund.org/nld/nld.htm>

Soros Foundation

An autonomous nonprofit organization founded by philanthropist George Soros to promote the development of open society. National foundations are located primarily in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also in other parts of the world.

<http://www.soros.org/>

Stefan Batory Foundation

An independent non-profit organization, established to support the wide-ranging advancement of Polish society, particularly in the fields of public, informational; cultural; scientific and educational activities addressed to the development of a free market and democracy in Poland, as well as the bringing together of the nations and states of Central and Eastern Europe.

<http://www.batory.org.pl/english/>

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

What Is Democracy?

The former U.S. Information Agency's pamphlet on democracy and its beginnings to the present day. This worldwide phenomenon belies the skeptics who have contended that modern liberal democracy is a uniquely Western artifact that can never be successfully replicated in non-Western cultures.

<http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/>

World Movement for Democracy

The World Movement for Democracy is an initiative to strengthen collaboration among those working to promote democratic values and institutions. The World Movement is inspired by the belief that the new global economy and the expansion of instantaneous global communications can create new opportunities and potential for effective collaboration among democrats on a worldwide scale.

<http://www.wmd.org/>

World Forum on Democracy

The World Forum will gather in Warsaw, June 25-27, democracy leaders and activists, academic experts, leaders of civic and religious organizations, representatives of the business community, labor, NGOs and the media to discuss the continued advancement of democratic governance and values throughout the world.

<http://www.fordemocracy.net/>

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